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and the court held the place of the executed sales contract was where
the acceptance was spoken.
Aside from these indications there is the persuasive argument of
the desirability of uniformity in contract law. The great majority of
states have adopted the view that telephone acceptances should be
governed by the same rules as telegrams and letters, and it is submitted that the West Virginia courts would feel as did the court in
the principal case, which stated:
"We believe that in this day of multistate commercial transactions it is particularly desirable that the determination of the
place of contracting be the same regardless of the state in which
suit takes place. The absence of uniformity makes the rights and
liabilities of parties to a contract dependent upon the choice of
the state in which suit is instituted and thus encourages forumshopping."
T. J. W.

CmxImrwIAL LAw-DEcEP=IVE ADvETisiNc--PRnis

INx MODEL

STAT=rrE.-The New York Penal Law § 421 prohibits untrue, deceptive or misleading advertising. Defendant placed several signs in his
store windows advertising the he was selling toys at a twenty per
cent to forty per cent discount. It was established from the evidence
that his prices were the same as or in excess of the prevailing prices
in the community. Held, affirming defendant's conviction, a retailer cannot establish his own prices at levels higher than the
prices customarily charged in the community and then mark his
prices down to a point equal to or in excess of the standard prices,
thereby creating the impression through advertising that the merchandise could be purchased at his store for less than it could be
purchased elsewhere. People v. Minijac Corp., 175 N.Y.S.2d 16, 151
N.E.2d 180 (1958).
In recent years advertising has become the dominant influence
in guiding the choices of the American public. The reliance of the
public on the truth thereof has given advertisers an instrumentality
for abuse, of which they have taken undue advantage. Established
remedies of deceit, breach of warranty, rescission, and unfair competition cannot be extended to cope with offenses which they were
never intended to cover. See Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22 (1929).
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There have been numerous statutes enacted covering practically
every phase of advertising, two of which are basic. The federal
government created the Federal Trade Commission whose jurisdiction includes the power to issue cease and desist orders against deceptive advertisers. 88 STAT. 717, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1926). However, since the Federal Trade Commission has power over interstate
commerce alone, this device can only protect the average consumer
in a small number of his purchases. Ward Baking Co. v. F.T.C., 264
Fed. 880 (2d Cir. 1920). Thus most of the states have adopted a
statute based on the "printer's ink model statute", which is a blanket
prohibition of untrue, deceptive, or misleading statements in any advertisement.
The statute under which the defendant was convicted in the
principal case was based on the so-called "printer's ink model
statute", drafted in 1911 for the advertising journal of that name.
See TAY~ai, LEGAL CONTROL OF TIM PREss § 87, at 606 (3d ed. 1956).
The constitutionality of these statutes has been uniformly upheld.
Commonwealth v. Reilly, 248 Mass. 1, 142 N.E. 915 (1924). Yet the
number of convictions thereunder has been few. In fact it appears
that most jurisdictions have never used the statutes at all, and only
a few have had more than a handful of prosecutions thereunder.
See 56 CoLTJm. L. REv. 1063 (1956).
In West Virginia the "printer's ink model statute" was adopted
in 1915 and appears in the present code. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 3,
§ 38 (Michie 1955). There has been only one attempted prosecution under this statute which reached our highest court and that resulted in an acquittal. State v. Wohimouth, 78 W. Va. 404, 89 S.E. 7
(1916). In that case the accused published an advertisment that to
each purchaser of a fifteen dollar suit there would be given a free
palm beach suit, when, in fact he never intended to give a palm
beach suit but to give one of inferior quality. The indictment was
quashed because there was no sale made under this advertisment
The court said, "this section is penal; and an indictment charging a
violation thereof must aver with precision all the constituent elements of the crime. Such indictment must not state a mere conclusion of law." Here the court's reading into the statute that there
must be a sale serves to illustrate the narrow construction given to
the statute.
In order to get a conviction under this type of statute which
carries the penal sanction of a misdemeanor, the prosecution ordi-
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narily must only prove three fundamental things. First, it must be
proved that there was an intent to sell or dispose of goods or services.
State v. Carruthers,21 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. App. 1929). Secondly, the
prosecution must establish that this advertisment was placed before
the publie in some manner. People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100
P.2d 550 (1940). Thirdly, such advertising must have contained
therein an untrue or misleading statement. People v. Byrnes, 117
Colo. 528, 190 P.2d 584 (1948). Thus it is seen that the statute imposes absolute liability on the advertiser; yet, from the small number of convictions thereunder it appears something more is necessary.
The major reason for the small number of convictions under
these statutes is the lack of an initiating agency to enforce them. Local police and other prosecuting agencies are probably unaware of
the existence of such a statute, and, even if they are aware, their
energies are diverted towards more profitable pursuits. A further
reason may be attributed to the narrow construction given the statutes by the courts. Only when the enforcement of the statutes is
assigned to some special agency or agencies and the courts begin to
focus a sterner view toward deceptive advertisers will the reason
for the enactment of these statutes be accomplished.
J. O. F.
CRnnmAL LAw-DuE PNocEss-CoEmcED CoN SSON
o IN STATE

CouRTs.-D, a mentally dull 19 year old Negro, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. He had been arrested without a
warrant, denied a hearing before a magistrate at which, under state
law, he would be advised of his right to counsel and to remain silent,
held incommunicado for more than two days, and told by the chief of
police that there were thirty or forty people coming who wanted to
get him. Under these circumstances D confessed to the murder.
The confession was admitted in evidence over the objection of D's
counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed and D brought certiorari. Held, that D's confession was coerced and its admission into evidence was denial of
due process under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Payne v. State, 354
U.S. 930 (1958).
Whether a confession made to police officers after arrest is voluntary or coerced is ordinarily a question directed to the discretion of
the trial court. State v. Dowell, 47 Idaho 457, 276 Pac. 39 (1929); 3
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